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which have required at least a showing of past discrimination before
approving numerical preferences. Because it ignored standing from
an individual's viewpoint, the decision appears to be outside the
mainstream of recent civil rights cases which have afforded white
plaintiffs access to the courts in order to vindicate their civil rights.7"
A decision at odds with this authority should be based on strong
precedent or cogent reasoning. The Mele decision is susceptible of
this meaning and deficient in both respects.*
Joseph P. Caracappa

PARENT AND CHILD-CUSTODY OF CHILD-VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT-PLACEMENT AGREEMENTS-The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-

vania has held that child placement agreements voluntarily executed by parents and the county child welfare agency which condition the child's return on the agency's approval are authorized by
state statutes and the regulations of the Department of Public Welfare and do not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
Lee v. Child Care Service Delaware County Institution District,
337 A.2d 586 (Pa. 1975).
On August 28, 1972, Rita and Edwin Lee executed a placement
agreement which transferred custody of their son to the Child Care
Service of the Delaware County Institution District.' By the terms
of the agreement, Child Care would arrange for placement, medical
care and appropriate visitation. The child would be returned under
conditions approved by Child Care. In case of'dispute between the
parties, the Juvenile Court of Delaware County would be available
to review the matter and issue necessary orders.' Approximately
76. See notes 40 & 55 supra.
* The Mele decision was appealed on June 3, 1975, and the case is pending before the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. Hereinafter referred to as Child Care.
2. The agreement form provided spaces for the date, the names of the family members
involved and the reason for the transfer, which was subject to the following conditions:
I, WE agree that said child/children may be removed from [our home] and hereby
grant and give custody of said child/children to said Child Care Service.
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eight months later, the Lees requested the return of their son. When
their request was denied, the Lees brought an action in an individual capacity and as representatives of the class of all residents of
Delaware County who had or would transfer custody of their children to Child Care by means of the placement agreements.3
The asserted grounds for the action were that the agreements were
made under material mistakes of fact, were without consideration,
were not authorized by state statute and that their use violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The Lees requested compensatory and punitive damages in addition to preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting further use of the
agreements without court approval. The defendants' preliminary
objections to the class action were sustained and the cause dismissed. 5
On appeal,6 the Lees contended that the regulations of the Department of Public Welfare which authorized the use of placement
agreements contravened the statutes under which they were promulgated and alternatively, assuming statutory authorization for
I, WE agree to work with Child Care Service until plans for said child/children are
completed in order that the interests of said child/children shall be adequately protected. I, WE further, agree that conditions for the return of the child/children shall
be subject to the approval of CHILD CARE SERVICE.
The agreement form is reproduced in full in Lee v. Child Care Serv. Del. County Inst. Dist.,
337 A.2d 586, 588 n.2 (Pa. 1975).
3. Lee v. Child Care Serv., 61 Del. 169 (C.P. Pa. 1974). As individuals, the Lees claimed
they had been fraudulently induced to sign the agreement and sought compensatory and
punitive damages from the caseworker, the director of Child Care, the director's administrative assistant, and two unnamed unknown agents of the service. For intentional infliction of
emotional distress and loss of consortium, the Lees sought additional compensatory and
punitive damages. All defendants filed preliminary objections. The chancellor upheld the
cause of action in tort against the caseworker, but deemed insufficient the allegations of
necessary intent on the part of the other named defendants. Leave was granted to amend the
complaint. Id. at 170-71, 174. As of this writing, the individual action was still pending in
the lower court.
4. Id. at 170-71. The allegations of mistake of fact and lack of consideration were not
raised on appeal from the dismissal of the class action because of their primary relevance to
the individual claims, which are still pending.
5. Id. at 182.
6. Lee v. Child Care Serv. Del. County Inst. Dist., 337 A.2d 586 (Pa. 1975). The Appellate
Court Jurisdiction Act § 202(4), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.202(4) (Supp. 1975), allows
direct appeal to the supreme court of final orders in equity cases. Although their individual
claim was unaffected, dismissal of the class action was a final order to the Lees as class
representatives and was, therefore, appealable. See DeAngeli v. Fitzgerald, 433 Pa. 529, 252
A.2d 706 (1969) (dismissal of wife's consortium action an appealable final order despite the
survival of husband's action in tort for injuries resulting from an auto accident).
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the agreements, that their use violated the parents' right of due
process.7 Both points were decided against the appellants.
The court adopted the chancellor's view that the County Institution District Law' required the Department of Public Welfare to
provide services for children at the request of the parents, with their
consent, or by court referral. The enabling statute9 authorized the
Department to make rules and regulations which were necessary
and proper to carry out those duties. In the court's view, the Department was acting within the authority granted by the statutes when
it promulgated regulations 3220 C and 3231 D, which authorized the
use of placement agreements. These regulations provided that, absent a court order, children could not be removed from their homes
without written parental consent. I"
Appellants relied on the United States Supreme Court decisions
in Stanley v. Illinois" and Armstrong v. Manzol2 for the proposition
7. The Lees also asserted that the Adoption Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 301-03, 311-13
(Supp. 1975) and the Juvenile Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101 to -337 (Supp. 1975),
which require court hearings before children may be removed from their parents, should be
considered in pari materia to the County Institution District Law, text of which appears at
note 8 infra. The supreme court observed that those statutes were irrelevant because they
dealt exclusively with permanent transfers of custody rather than the "non-final, consensual
transfer of custody achieved by the execution of a 'placement agreement' " of the type used
by Child Care. 337 A.2d at 589. The Lees further suggested that the agreements were void as
against public policy found in Pennsylvania case law. The court rejected this argument by
pointing out the majority of Pennsylvania decisions held only that such contracts were subject
to judicial scrutiny and did not serve as final dispositions of the custody of the children
involved. If the interests of the child would be best served by an arrangement other than that
provided in the contract, the court might, at its discretion, declare the agreement void. Id.
at 590 and cases cited therein.
8. The County Institution District Law provides:
The local authorities of any institution district shall have the power, and for the
purpose of protecting and promoting the welfare of children and youth, it shall be their
duty to provide those child welfare services designed to keep children in their own
home, prevent neglect, abuse and exploitation, help overcome problems that result in
dependency, neglect or delinquency, to provide in foster family homes or child caring
institutions adequate substitute care for any child in need of such care and, upon the
request of the court, to provide such service and care for children and youth who have
been adjudicated dependent, neglected or delinquent.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2305 (1968).
9. Id. § 703.
10.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MANUAL FOR SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND

YOUTH, TITILE 3200, REGULATIONS PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES regs. 3220 C, 3231 D (1969)

[hereinafter cited as DPW C & Y Reg. 3220 C and DPW C & Y reg. 3231 D]. The text of
DPW C & Y reg. 3220 C appears at note 45 infra. See note 33 infra for text of DPW C & Y
reg. 3231 D.
11. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (due process required an unwed natural father be given a hearing
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that parents have a constitutionally protected interest in their children which may not be abrogated without due process of law. The
court agreed that the parental interest existed, but did not find that
the use of placement agreements in any way violated that right. 3
Stanley and Armstrong were distinguished on the ground that they
involved permanent termination of parental rights without consent,
whereas the agreement questioned by appellants effected a consensual non-final transfer." The court noted the clear language of the
agreement advising parents that the conditions for the return of
their children were subject to the approval of Child Care. Moreover,
the court observed appellants had not utilized the juvenile court
proceeding prescribed by the agreement as the means for handling
disputes. Since appellants had failed to show that the regulations
were inconsistent with the statutes or that the procedures used by
Child Care had violated their right of due process, the supreme
court affirmed the chancellor's dismissal of the class action.
In a dissent 5 joined by Justice Manderino, Justice Nix suggested
the majority had merged the concepts of foster care and custody,
despite the fact that the regulations clearly distinguished the two
types of transfers and established different methods for accomplishing them. Transfers for purposes of "foster care" could be made with
parental consent, but where a transfer of "custody" was contemplated a petition to juvenile court was required." In the opinion of
the dissenters, the agreement used in this case went beyond the
authority granted by the regulations unless it was read to provide
that Child Care could give the child foster care only so long as the
agreement remained consensual." The dissent further suggested
that the majority opinion ignored public policy, which dictated
against forcing parents to initiate proceedings to prove their fitness
as guardians of their children. As a result of the decision, parents
in need of assistance might hesitate to seek help from the Departto prove his fitness as a parent before his children could be taken in a dependency proceeding).
12. 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (adoption decree obtained by the mother and her second husband
held invalid where natural father had been given no notice of the proceeding).
13. 337 A.2d at 590.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 591.
16. Id.; DPW C & Y reg. 3231 D. See note 33 infra.
17. 337 A.2d at 591 (Nix, J., dissenting).
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ment of Public Welfare out of fear of a permanent loss of their
children."8
The appellants had attacked the agreement by challenging the
regulations which authorized it, charging the regulations contravened the statutes since the regulations permitted transfers of custody by voluntary agreement when the statutes allowed such transfers only by court order. In response, the court determined that the
statute permitted voluntary transfers of "custody," but did not define "custody" or distinguish it from "foster care." The majority's
conclusion on the issue whether the regulations contravened the
statute appears to be correct. That result, however, does not minimize the importance of the dissent. The dissent addressed a different issue: whether the agreements themselves were valid, in light of
their practical effect.
The validity of the agreement in application must be examined
against the background of prior case law. It is well established in
Pennsylvania that parents have a natural and prima facie right to
the custody of their children. 9 This right arises from the legal obligation of parents to support and educate their children."0 There is a
strong but rebuttable presumption that the interests of children are.
best served when they are in the custody of their natural parents.',
18. Id.
19. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wormser, 260 Pa. 44, 103 A. 500 (1918) (just as parents had
natural right to control of children, state as parens patriae had authority to regulate minors'
working hours to protect their health and safety); Commonwealth ex rel. Parker v. Blatt, 165
Pa. 213, 30 A. 674 (1895) (parents' legal right to custody of their children should not be altered
hastily, as the likelihood of damage to the relationship is too great); Commonwealth ex rel.
Kennan v. Thomas, 151 Pa. Super. 131, 30 A.2d 246 (1943) (the prima facie right to custody
of children is not overcome by fact that parents are temporarily unable to care for the child).
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. Smith, 170 Pa. Super. 254, 85 A.2d 686
(1952) (maternal grandparents not entitled to custody or visiting privileges where natural
father demanded custody, despite grandparents' strong feelings for the child); Commonwealth ex rel. McTighe v. Lindsey, 156 Pa. Super. 560, 40 A.2d 881 (1945) (foster parents
could not overcome father's prima facie right to custody of eight-year-old child even though
she had been in foster home since she was seven months old).
21. Commonwealth ex rel. Bendrick v. White, 403 Pa. 55, 169 A.2d 69 (1961) (child's best
interests dictated award of custody to foster parents where father traveled frequently and
planned to leave the child in care of others while he was away); Cochran Appeal, 394 Pa. 162,
145 A.2d 857 (1958) (presumption in favor of natural mother buttressed by showing that her
new husband could adequately support her children, who had been in a foster home since
her divorce); Commonwealth ex rel. Harry v. Eastridge, 374 Pa. 172, 97 A.2d 350 (1953) (court
may not overlook finding that natural mother was caring for children improperly, in deference
to presumption that the best interests of children are served in the custody of their natural
parents).
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Hence, although the child is considered a ward of the state, judicial
standards for state intrusion into the family have traditionally been
quite high.22 State interference will be permitted only if the best
interests of the child dictate,2" if compelling 4 or substantial 5 reasons are evident, or if a clear necessity exists." Even where the
decision has been made to remove a child from his home, the disposition is not final;27 it is based on the circumstances existing at the
time of the hearing and is subject to modification if the situation
should change."
The legislature has set the standards for state intervention at an
equally high level. A child may not be taken from his parents under
the Juvenile Act, for example, unless he has been judicially declared
delinquent or deprived. 9
22. Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 92, 66 A.2d 300, 304
(1949) (two-year-old illegitimate girl left with foster parents although state agency sought her
custody, since court could find no reason to interfere in the family where the child was well
cared for); In re Brown's Estate, 166 Pa. 249, 252, 30 A. 1122, 1123 (1895) (minors permitted
to remain with great-aunt despite contrary provisions in the will of children's father, rather
than upset the settled existence of the children).
23. In re Snellgrose, 432 Pa. 158, 164-65, 247 A.2d 596, 599 (1968) (natural mother denied
custody of teenage daughter where evidence indicated mother had been and currently was
involved in illicit relationships); Commonwealth ex rel. Burke v. Birch, 169 Pa. Super. 537,
539, 83 A.2d 426, 427 (1951) (natural father who had several illicit affairs during his three
marriages denied custody of his son); Commonwealth ex rel. Logsdon v. Logsdon, 156 Pa.
Super. 85, 87, 39 A.2d 461, 462 (1944) (best interests of child dictated award of custody to
paternal grandparents where father was at war, mother had recently suffered a nervous
breakdown and maternal grandfather was an alcoholic); Commonwealth ex rel. Cleary v.
Weaver, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 715, 717 (C.P. Clinton Co. 1957), aff'd mem., 188 Pa. Super. 197,
146 A.2d 374, 376 (1958) (natural mother forbidden custody of daughter where mother had
seen child only four times in six years and child did not know mother's present husband).
24. Commonwealth ex rel. Harry v. Eastridge, 374 Pa. 172, 175, 97 A.2d 350, 351 (1953).
25. Commonwealth ex rel. Parker v. Blatt, 165 Pa. 213, 215, 30 A. 674 (1895); Commonwealth ex rel. Lees v. Lees, 196 Pa. Super. 32, 36, 173 A.2d 691, 693 (1961) (maternal uncle
failed to show substantial reasons for retaining custody of child where the father was shown
to be equally capable of providing for the boy's welfare).
26. Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. 371, 386, 324 A.2d 562,
572 (1974) (foster parents may raise issue of who should have custody of child despite prior
agreement to return the child when requested by the child care service); In re Rinker, 180
Pa. Super. 143, 148, 117 A.2d 780, 783 (1955) (although mother had been hospitalized twice
and kept company with married men, the evidence was insufficient to show the clear necessity
for state intervention to protect the children).
27. Commonwealth ex rel. Cleary v. Weaver, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 715, 718 (C.P. Clinton Co.
1957) (should mother's conduct improve, order awarding custody of child to grandparents
could be reconsidered).
28. Id.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101(3), -102(3), (4) (Supp. 1975). These standards are
necessarily stringent, as the United States Supreme Court has held that the Constitution
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Contracts for transfer of custody are not contrary to public policy
so long as the transfer is made with the welfare of the child in
mind. l A parent's right to custody is not a property right in the
contract sense; the relationship between parent and child is a status
and is not a proper subject of contract." Contractual transfers,
therefore, though not void on their face, have been repeatedly held
voidable at the discretion of the court if the best interests of the
32
children dictate.
The issue whether the placement agreement in Lee infringed the
child's best interests was not before the court, since only the class
protects parental interests from abrogation without due process of law. In Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), the lower court's refusal to set aside the adoption of a child by
her mother's second husband in an ex parte proceeding was reversed on the ground that the
natural father's constitutional interest in his child was violated by the failure to give him
notice of the proceeding. The constitutional infirmity was not cured by affording a hearing
after the decree, since at that time the father would be required to carry a substantial burden
of proof which would have been on those seeking the adoption had he been given the required
notice. See note 47 infra.
30. See, e.g., In re Book's Estate, 297 Pa. 543, 147 A. 608 (1929) (contract surrendering
custody of child to aunt was not contrary to public policy where parents' disagreements
operated to the detriment of the child); Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894)
(dictum) (simply selling a child for money would violate public policy).
31. Mallinger v. Mallinger, 197 Pa. Super. 34, 175 A.2d 890 (1961); Commonwealth ex rel.
Teitelbaum v. Teitelbaum, 160 Pa. Super. 286, 50 A.2d 713 (1947); Commonwealth ex rel.
Goessler v. Bernstein, 149 Pa. Super. 29, 26 A.2d 213 (1942); In re Rosenthal, 103 Pa. Super.
27, 157 A. 342 (1931). These cases involved pre-divorce agreements between parents. The
superior court indicated that the marital status of the parents was irrelevant to the validity
of agreements between them concerning the custody of their children. For the view that such
contracts are illegal unless explicitly authorized by statute see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
583 (1932).
32. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300
(1949); Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894); Commonwealth ex rel. Bankert v.
Children's Servs., 224 Pa. Super. 556, 307 A.2d 411 (1973) (contract between foster parents
and child care service requiring return of child when requested by service held not determinative of the question of custody); Commonwealth ex rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 171 Pa. Super.
587, 91 A.2d 379 (1952) (pre-divorce agreement between parents set aside where it appeared
children would be exposed to undesirable influences in the custody of their father); Commonwealth ex rel. Berg v. Catholic Bureau, 167 Pa. Super. 514, 76 A.2d 427 (1950) (a purportedly
irrevocable transfer agreement held void where it appeared the interests of the child would
be best served by that result).
Pennsylvania courts have also ignored such contracts where it appeared that consent had
been given under pressure. In re Hildenbrand, 405 Pa. 579, 176 A.2d 900 (1962) (forty-yearold unwed mother subjected to humiliation by her family and forced to move out of state).
The consent must be intelligent, voluntary and deliberate. In re Susko, 363 Pa. 78, 83, 69 A.2d
132, 135 (1949) (consent of young unwed mother invalidated by excessive coercion by brothers). But cf. In re Watson, 450 Pa. 579, 301 A.2d 861 (1973), in which the court used the test
announced in the earlier cases but held that an intelligent and capable adolescent of fourteen
years and her deaf-mute mother could give adequate consent.
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aspects of the claim had been appealed; the agreement was challenged as an infringement of parental interests, not those of the
transferred children. The court was asked to determine the validity
of the agreement through examination of the County Institution
District Law and the regulations of the Department of Public Welfare.
The view of the dissent that regulation 3231 D does not permit
transfers of "custody" by voluntary agreement is supportable.
Regulation 3231 D clearly distinguishes two types of child transfer
situations, one wherein written consent is appropriate and one wherein a court order is necessary.3 3 The former situation is represented
as "foster care," while the latter is characterized as "custody" for
the child's protection. The distinction must rest on the nature of the
transfer, and it is suggested that one critical factor is time: transfers
for a contemplated period may be made by written consent of the
parents, but transfers for an indefinite time which are more permanent in nature may only be made pursuant to court order, regardless
of the consent of the parents. 4
The County Institution District Law does not use the term
"custody." Rather, the legislature spoke in terms of providing "substitute care" in "foster family homes" and "child caring institutions."35 In devising the regulations which would govern its operations, however, the Department of Public Welfare gave meaning to
the statutory language. Regulation 3205.3 defines foster family care
as "a social service which provides substitute family life for a
planned period of time for children who have been separated from
33.

DPW C & Y reg. 3231 D provides:
When a child is received for foster care at the request of the parents or with their
consent, the placement agreement concerning such care shall be in writing, signed by
the child's parents and by a representative of the public child welfare agency. A
petition to the juvenile court shall not be required for placement of a child, except
when change of custody or guardianship of a child is deemed advisable for his protection.
34. Cf. Adoption Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 301-03 (Supp. 1975). Where a complete
and permanent termination of all parental rights is to be accomplished by adoption, a hearing
and judicial decree are required even if the parents consent.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2305 (1968). The relevant portion of the statute is quoted at
note 8 supra. The only definition of "custody" found in Pennsylvania case law is in Commonwealth ex rel. Hartley v. Hartley, 35 North. 262, 263 n.1 (C.P. Pa. 1958):
"Custody" of a minor embraces the sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing
of the minor, and connotes a keeping or guarding of the child. It includes in its meaning
every element of provision for the physical, moral and mental well being of the minor
including its immediate personal care and control.
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their natural or legal parents. '36 The clear implication is that foster
care is temporary. Moreover, a reading of regulation 3231 D itself
suggests time is a distinguishing factor. Thus, the regulations appear to equate temporary transfers with "foster care," and more
permanent transfers with "change of custody." 7
The court did not note this distinction when it characterized the
agreement used by Child Care as a "non-final, consensual transfer
of custody. ' 31 Yet a non-final transfer under the regulations would
not be a transfer of "custody." The form contract purported to
transfer custody39 when, according to regulation 3231 D, voluntary
transfer agreements could be used only when the child was received
for foster care." The agreement did not conform to this reading of
the regulations."
As shown by the majority opinion, at least one other interpretation of the regulations is possible, one that would permit transfers
of custody by voluntary agreement. Under such a reading the consensual nature of the transfer would be the sole factor in determining whether a court order would be necessary. Nevertheless, in evaluating the agreement used in Lee under either interpretation, the
important consideration is the effect of the contract in application."
Since conditions for the return of the child were subject to the
approval of Child Care, the Lees' son was not immediately returned
when they withdrew their consent. Child Care might assert that the
retraction of parental consent was ineffective to either invalidate
36.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MANUAL FOR SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND

3205.3 (1969) (emphasis
supplied).
37. Apparently, the acting members of Child Care operated under a different interpretation. In their brief before the supreme court, the appellees distinguished a "voluntary placement of custody" from "a full and complete termination of parental rights," implying that
custody could be temporary. Brief for Appellees at 10, Lee v. Child Care Serv. Del. County
Inst. Dist., 337 A.2d 586 (Pa. 1975).
Even court-ordered alterations of custody rights are not fully permanent. Commonwealth
ex rel. Cleary v. Weaver, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 715, 718 (C.P. Clinton Co. 1957), aff'd mem., 188
Pa. Super. 197, 146 A.2d 374, 376 (1958). See text at notes 27-28 supra.
38. 337 A.2d at 589 (emphasis added).
39. The words of the agreement were: "I, WE ... hereby grant and give custody .
Id. at 588 n.2.
40. DPW C & Y reg. 3231 D, the relevant text of which is at note 33 supra.
41. The regulations are binding on the county institution districts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62,
§ 703 (1968).
42. On the dangers of the use of such placement agreements by overzealous caseworkers
and undereducated parents see Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystification of the Child Protection System, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Levine].
YOUTH. TITLE 3200. REc.ULATIONS PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES reg.
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the agreement or compel the return of the child because the original
consent continued to bind the parents. While this argument might
have considerable weight in a commercial setting, it is unpersuasive
where the agreement deals with the control of children, which is not
a proper subject of contract and must serve the child's best interests.43 Withdrawal of parental consent should have the effect of
invalidating the original transfer agreement, since retention of the
child after the withdrawal of consent is equivalent to a nonconsensual transfer of custody without a court order.
Retention without consent had the effect of a final judicial decree
where none had been issued. Had Child Care returned the child at
the request of his parents and then instituted proceedings in juvenile court pursuant to regulation 3220 C, no dispute could have
arisen as to the validity of the agreement. Had the supreme court
discovered the unauthorized effect of the agreement, it would have
recognized the duty of Child Care to conform its operations to this
requirement of regulation 3220 C. By failing to explore the real
implications of the contract as applied, the decision in Lee permits
continued use of transfer agreements which can operate to allow
public welfare agencies to retain children indefinitely against the
wishes of their parents without the safeguard of prior judicial determination.4 This result is without authority under regulations 3220
C,11 3231 D4 and the County Institution District Law.4"
43. Such contracts are in a special category, since they are voidable at the discretion of
the court where the child's best interests dictate. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text
supra.
44. At least one observer feels the courts accept the views of child care agencies in Juvenile
Act cases without question, perhaps with the thought that a caseworker can more competently evaluate the situation. The fear is that courts have become mere rubber stamps for
decisions already made by the agencies. Levine, supra note 42, at 33. For the suggestion that
the articulated standards may be difficult for judges to apply see Tamilia, Neglect Proceedings and the Conflict Between Law and Social Work, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 579, 584 (1971).
45. DPW C & Y reg. 3220 C reads:
Children shall not be removed from their own homes without the written consent of
the parents . . . unless the child has been committed to the agency by a court. The
legal status of the child shall be ascertained and recorded. When the legal status of
the child is in doubt, the agency shall petition the appropriate court for a determination of status.
46. The relevant text of DPW C & Y reg. 3231 D is at note 33 supra.
47. The text of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2305 (1968) is at note 8 supra.
By denying the need for the statutorily required judicial decree prior to an alteration of
custody, the agreement may also have deprived the parents of their constitutionally protected
interest in their children without due process of law as in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) and Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). See notes 11 and 29 supra. The court

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 14: 284

The public policy consequences of the Lee decision, as Justice Nix
observed in his dissent," could be most serious. Lee makes it possible for an organ of the state to retain control over a child without a
court order after parental consent to a supposedly temporary agreement has been terminated.49 The transfer of custody takes on characteristics of a permanent transfer and forces parents to petition for
writs of habeas corpus to regain the custody of their children.50 This
result undermines the welfare of the children involved, whose best
interests have long been of major concern to the courts and the
legislature; parents in need of temporary assistance for the care of
their children may hesitate to seek help from child care services
because they fear the permanent loss of their sons or daughters. The
use and judicial approval of placement agreements like those in Lee
found no denial of due process because consent was originally given and the juvenile court
was available to review disputes. 337 A.2d at 590. Even if the original consent constituted
waiver of parental rights to notice and hearing, this consent or waiver should be revocable.
The Lees would sue for custody of their son in order to obtain his return. The juvenile court,
however, would have no jurisdiction over the custody suit unless Child Care were to assert
the child was deprived. It is more likely that Child Care would defend the action on grounds
that the original consent was irrevocable, rather than carry the burden of proving deprivation.
In that event, juvenile court would be an improper forum for the dispute despite the fact that
it is made available to the parties by the terms of the agreement. Generally, juvenile court
may affect the custody of children only in cases of delinquency, deprivation or other specialized circumstances not present in this case. Juvenile Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-102(8),
-103, -303, -329 to -332 (Supp. 1975). See In re Tuttle, 356 Pa. 378, 52 A.2d 313 (1947); In re
Rose, 161 Pa. Super. 204, 54 A.2d 297 (1947). But cf. In re Salemno, 169 Pa. Super. 240, 82
A.2d 560 (1951).
As an alternative remedy, the Lees could petition a court of common pleas for a writ of
habeas corpus. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 251 (1962). The existence of this potential remedy
does not negate the possibility of a denial of due process. In Stanley, the United States
Supreme Court recognized the deprivation occasioned by the delay between the unauthorized
taking of the child and the subsequent issuance of a court order remedying the situation. 405
U.S. at 647. Moreover, this remedy may be inadequate due to an impermissible shift of the
burden of proof. The parents will be the moving parties in the habeas corpus action and will
be required to prove that the interests of their son will be best served by his return to them.
Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974). In
contrast, had Child Care been forced to obtain the required court order, the burden of showing
the compelling reasons for state interference with the family unit would have fallen on the
agency. DPW C & Y reg. 3220 C. The alternative remedy of habeas corpus, which forces the
aggrieved parents to sustain a substantially higher burden of proof, would not serve to repair
the damage caused by the original unconstitutional deprivation. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545 (1965).
48. 337 A.2d at 591.
49. Agreements of the type used in Lee are widely employed in Pennsylvania. Levine,
supra note 42, at 26.
50. See note 47 supra.
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may erode an evinced legislative policy favoring the family unit."
Finally, the court's failure to search into the actual effect of these
agreements contradicts the well established, well considered judicial policy of carefully guarding the family from unwarranted state
intrusions.
David S. Bunnel

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FOURTEENTH

CESS-SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS-

AMENDMENT-DUE

PRO-

The Supreme Court of the United

States has held that a public school student threatened with suspension of ten days or less is, absent danger or emergency, entitled
to prior notification and a rudimentary hearing.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Pursuant to Ohio law,' Dwight Lopez and eight other students
from various high schools of the Columbus, Ohio public school
system were summarily suspended for periods of up to ten days' for
disciplinary reasons.' Prior to their suspensions, the students had
been neither granted a hearing nor notified of the charges against
them. The students filed a class action suit against the Columbus
Board of Education and certain administrators of the school system,4 seeking a declaration that the Ohio statute authorizing the
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101(b)(1) (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2305
(1968).
1. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (Page 1972) provided that authorized school officials
could suspend pupils for not more than ten days. The only statutory procedural requirements
were notification to the parent or guardian and the clerk of the board of education within
twenty-four hours after the suspension.
2. The statute allowed a school authority to expel a student upon notification to the
parent or guardian within twenty-four hours. The term of expulsion could not extend beyond
the current semester. The pupil, parent or guardian could appeal the expulsion to the board
of education; there was no statutory right to appeal a suspension. Id.
3. The suspensions occurred during a period of widespread unrest in the Columbus school
system. Several of the students had participated in disruptive demonstrations on school
premises during regular class hours. One student had physically attacked a police officer and
had been suspended immediately. Another was arrested at a demonstration at a high school
other than the one in which she was enrolled; she was notified of her suspension on the
following day before she went to school. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 570-71 (1975).
4. Plaintiffs brought the action under provisions of the Civil Rights Act which provide:

